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A B S T R A C T
The article examines causalities between sovereign, most important quasi-sovereign CDS
prices (Gazprom, VTB, Sberbank) for Russia and the global volatility factor embedded in
the VIX index dynamics. The analysis refers to the post-bailout period in this major emerg-
ing economy (May 2009–July 2013). The causalities are assessed in the time (the Hong test)
and frequency (the Breitung–Candelon test) domains. The VIX index dynamics has a strong
impact on all Russian CDS, but also receives a non-negligible feedback from them. The sov-
ereign and quasi-sovereign CDS prices exhibit a strong causal connectedness in both domains,
with the impact of the quasi-sovereigns (in particular, that of banks) getting more pro-
nounced in the longer run, i.e. over longer time horizons and at lower frequencies. High
foreign exposure of the quasi-sovereigns, explicit/implicit public guarantees and the hold-
ings of the Russian sovereign debt on their balances underlie the causalities. Given the
systemic role that the government-controlled entities play in the Russian economy, this may
lead to the “too big to save” effect with negative implications for ﬁnancial and ﬁscal stability.
Copyright © 2015 Production and hosting by Elsevier Ltd on behalf of Asia-Paciﬁc
Research Center, Hanyang University.
1. Introduction
One of the salient features of the initial phase of the Great
Recession was the credit risk transfer between corporate
sector and sovereigns. In autumn 2008, when many na-
tional governments announced rescue packages for corporate
sector (primarily, ﬁnancial ﬁrms), risk spreads of the cor-
porate sector declined while sovereign spreads increased
as investors perceived possible negative effects of these bail-
outs for public debt sustainability.
The credit risk transfer has been well documented in
credit default swap (CDS) markets,1 especially with respect
to the EU countries. However, post-bailout linkages between
sovereign and corporate credit risk have received less at-
tention, though the nexus between the two remains tight
and is often dubbed “deadly embrace” or “doom loop” (Fahri
& Tirole, 2014). The repercussions of the “deadly embrace”
are primarily studied for advanced economies while little
is known about the post-bailout linkages between sover-
eign and corporate credit risk in case of the major emerging
economies that faced the credit risk transfer. The mechan-
ics of the “deadly embrace” in these countries may be
different from the advanced countries’ experience due to
lower public indebtedness levels and signiﬁcant public stakes
in systemically important ﬁnancial and non ﬁnancial ﬁrms.
The paper attempts to partly ﬁll in this gap by examin-
ing causal linkages between sovereign and major corporate
CDS series (Gazprom, Sberbank and VTB) for Russia from
May 2009 to July 2013. It also studies causality between the
Russian CDS series and the global volatility factor embed-
ded in the VIX index dynamics. The peculiar feature of such
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research for Russia is that the mentioned entities are
government-controlled. Therefore, the focus is actually on
the causality between global volatility, sovereign and quasi-
sovereign credit risk. This analysis also appears important
as it sheds light on causal linkages between the sovereign
and major corporate CDS shortly before the imposition
of sanctions. The baseline analysis makes a distinction
between two types of causality – causality-in-mean and
causality-variance.
The paper uncovers two notable ﬁndings. First, global vol-
atility contributes signiﬁcantly to the Russian CDS prices,
both sovereign and quasi-sovereign. This impact is partic-
ularly pronounced with respect to causality-in-mean. The
causality-in-variance tests reveal a moderate yet statisti-
cally signiﬁcant feedback in the opposite direction – from
the sovereign and bank CDS prices to the VIX index.
Second, similar to the Eurozone experience, the article pro-
vides evidence for causality-in-mean running from the
sovereign CDS prices to the bank ones after the Russian gov-
ernment interventions to bail out the ﬁnancial sector in late
2008 while bi-directional linkages are found regarding
causality-in-variance.
Bi-directional linkages between the sovereign and bank
CDS prices are conﬁrmed when causal relations are inves-
tigated in the frequency rather than time domain by means
of the Breitung and Candelon (2006) test. High foreign ex-
posure of the quasi-sovereigns, explicit/implicit public
guarantees and the holdings of the Russian sovereign debt
on their balances underlie the causal connectedness. In view
of the systemic role that the government-controlled enti-
ties play in the Russian economy this may lead to the “too
big to save” phenomenon with negative implications for ﬁ-
nancial and ﬁscal stability.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows.
Section 2 reviews relevant literature, Section 3 presents the
data, Section 4 describes econometric methodology. Section
5 discusses the results, Section 6 presents the robustness
checks and Section 7 concludes.
2. Relevant literature review
The empirical literature on the credit risk transfer ob-
served in CDS markets during the Great Recession hinges
around two initial contributions by Acharya, Drechsler, and
Schnabl (2014) and Ejsing and Lemke (2011). They provide
evidence for the credit risk transfer and subsequent two-
way feedback between ﬁnancial and sovereign credit risk
using data on CDS series of the Eurozone countries in 2007–
2010 and 2008–2009 respectively.
In line with these studies, Stanga (2011) discovers only
a temporary post-bailout drop in the credit risk of Spanish
and Irish banks, pointing to a co-movement between bank
and sovereign CDS spread dynamics. Alter and Schuler
(2012) also focus on Eurozone countries and characterize
the pattern of post-bailout sovereign and ﬁnancial sector
CDS price co-movement. They conclude that after the gov-
ernment interventions changes in the sovereign CDS spreads
contribute permanently to ﬁnancial sector CDS spreads,
while changes in banks’ default risks affect the sovereign
CDS spreads transitorily. They have a strong impact in the
very short run (up to 2 days) but this effect becomes in-
signiﬁcant in the long run (up to 3weeks) with the exception
of Italy, Spain and Portugal. Mody and Sandri (2012) track
the developments that made sovereign and bank credit risks
intertwined and conclude that the outbreak of the Greek
crisis in 2010 was as important in strengthening this co-
movement as the collapse of Lehman Brothers in September
2008. Similar evidence is provided by Alter and Beyer (2014)
who quantify spillovers between bank and sovereign CDS
spreads for the Eurozone from October 2009 to July 2012
and compute a special contagion index, showing that the
interdependencies between banks and sovereigns had been
on the rise throughout the period, though the negative
impact of PIIGS began to diminish after the implementa-
tion of IMF/EU stabilization programs.
Avino and Cotter (2014) ﬁnd that sovereign and bank CDS
spreads in 6 major EU economies are cointegrated vari-
ables at the country level. They also conclude that sovereign
CDS play a pivotal role for the price discovery of bank CDS
in the most distressed economies (Portugal, Spain) while
more resilient economies (Germany, Sweden) show a leading
role for the bank CDS. Gross and Kok (2013), Corzo
Santamaría, Gómez Biscarri, and Lazcano Benito (2014),
López Pascual and Lovreta (2014) provide evidence that the
credit risk transmission from the sovereigns to banks has
been more pronounced since the outbreak of the Europe-
an debt crisis than the transmission running in the opposite
direction. In line with this evidence, Beckenfelder and
Schwaab (2015) assert that by late 2014 there was already
no credit risk transmission from banks to respective sov-
ereigns in stressed EU countries. They also ﬁnd a signiﬁcant
cross-border component in the bank–sovereign nexus as
non-stressed economies did bear the risk by providing guar-
antees to banks in the stressed ones.
De Bruyckere, Gerhardt, Schepens, and Vander Vennet
(2013) identify three channels of the “deadly embrace” –
public guarantees, asset holdings and collateral channel.
Kallestrup, Lando, and Murgoci (2013) conﬁrm the signif-
icance of explicit and implicit government guarantees
extended to an EU country’s banking system as a channel
of contagion between sovereign and bank CDS and add an
increased foreign exposure of banks to the list of the con-
tagion channels. Bedendo and Colla (2015) ﬁnd that
government guarantees is an important transmissionmech-
anism between sovereign and corporate credit risk in case
of non-ﬁnancial corporate CDS spreads.
Bai and Wei (2012) study the strength of the credit risk
transfer from the sovereigns to the private sector for gov-
ernment and corporate CDS series from 30 countries in
January 2008–February 2010 and ﬁnd that on the average
a 100 basis points increase in the sovereign CDS spreads
results in an increase in corporate CDS spreads by 71 basis
points. Interestingly, in light of this research they also assert
that this relationship is stronger for government-controlled
companies. Bedendo and Colla (2015) arrive at similar ﬁnd-
ings regarding the adverse role of public ownership.
Nevertheless, it may be mitigated by strong property rights
that prevent the state facing the risk of debt default from
expropriating the private sector. In addition to this argu-
ment explaining the intimate interrelation between
sovereign and corporate credit risk, a high share of sover-
eign debt on bank balance sheets contributes to these
72 M. Stolbov / Journal of Eurasian Studies 7 (2016) 71–84
feedback effects as banks see sovereign bonds appealing as
they can be easily used as collateral in interbank markets
and central bank emergency lending during hard times. It
is discussed, for example, in Merler and Pisani-Ferri (2012).
However, neither of the papers explicitly tackles the
problem of causality between sovereign and corporate credit
risk in the post-bailouts period.2 The paper which directly
addresses the issue and is the closest in methodology to our
research is Tamakoshi and Hamori (2013) who examine
causal linkages between Greek CDS spreads and the
Eurozone banking CDS index before the crisis (from January
2008 to November 2009) and after its start (from Decem-
ber 2009 to December 2011). Their analysis is based on
cross-correlation function techniques that disentangle
causality-in-mean and causality-in-variance. It reveals a
strong unidirectional causality-in-mean and causality-in-
variance from the Eurozone banks to Greek sovereign debt
before the crisis and vice versa in regard to causality-in-
variance from December 2009 to December 2011. The
present research also has something in common with
Tamakoshi and Hamori (2014b) who investigate the causal
interrelations among CDS indices of the US banking, ﬁnan-
cial services and insurance sectors based on the same
methodology and ﬁnd that the ﬁnancial services sector, being
the least regulated, constitutes an important transmission
mechanism of credit risk across all the sectors.
3. Data
Daily 5-year sovereign and corporate CDS prices are used
to conduct the research. Gazprom, Sberbank and VTB CDS
series are the most liquid among Russian corporate credit
default swaps and correspond to the companies that play
a crucial role in the Russian economy.3 The data are sourced
from CMAvision, an authoritative international database on
credit risk, and contain 1095 observations from May 2009
to July 2013,4 thereby encompassing the post-bailout period
in the Russian economy.5 The VIX index daily dynamics re-
trieved from Chicago Board Options Exchange (CBOE) is used
to estimate the causal linkage of Russian sovereign and
quasi-sovereign credit risks with a measure of global
volatility. The higher the VIX index, the more volatile in-
ternational ﬁnancial markets are expected to be in the
nearest future. This measure of global volatility is re-
ported to be an important fear gauge not only for advanced
economies but for the BRICS as well. Moreover, it appears
to have forward looking properties in thesemarkets (Sarwar,
2012).
All the series display a high degree of co-movement, with
correlation ratios ranging from 0.49 (between VIX and
2 To be more precise, papers that would rely on (no) causality tests are
meant. There are papers that assess the dependence between sovereign
and corporate credit risk in a quasi-experimental setting, allowing for causal
inference. For example, Augustin, Boustanifar, Breckenfelder, and Schnitzler
(2014b) show that after the Greek bailout a one percent increase in sov-
ereign credit risk raised corporate borrowing costs by 0.1 percent. Prior
to the event, this relation was insigniﬁcant.
3 Gazprom is the biggest corporate (quasi-sovereign) entity in the Russian
economy by assets, while Sberbank and VTB are the most important banks
which are also state-controlled. There are nearly 70 companies in Russia
which have launched Eurobonds that may serve as a reference obliga-
tion for CDS issuance. Nevertheless, except for the mentioned companies,
these CDS are rarely traded and are highly illiquid.
4 It seems problematic to model the credit risk transfer itself as the cor-
porate CDS series containmultiple breaks that refer to late 2008–early 2009.
5 Most of the bailouts in Russia were implemented in September–
December 2008. In particular, the state contributed to the recapitalization
of systemic banks via subordinate loans, including Sberbank and VTB,
and the Bank of Russia launched different programs of their direct
reﬁnancing.
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Fig. 1. Daily sovereign and quasi-sovereign CDS price dynamics and VIX index, May 2009–July 2013.
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Sberbank CDS series) to 0.98 (between Russia and Gazprom)
(Fig. 1).
The descriptive statistics for all the series are pre-
sented in Table 1. The daily mean of CDS price series varies
from 184.87 for the sovereign to 367.25 for VTB. The latter
also exhibits higher volatility among the series. With the
exception of Sberbank, the series show signs of positive
skewness and excess kurtosis. The Jarque–Bera test strongly
rejects the normality of the CDS price and the VIX index
series.
Standard unit root tests (Augmented Dickey–Fuller test
(ADF) and Phillips–Perron test (PP)) suggest that the series
are stationary, which is not corroborated by Kwiatkowski–
Phillips–Schmidt–Shin (KPSS) test and Dickey–Fuller–GLS
(DF–GLS) test that havemore power in comparisonwith ADF
and PP tests. To ensure stationarity of the series they are
ﬁrst-differenced. The baseline and ﬁrst-differenced series
and their squares (both levels and 1st differences) exhibit
serial correlation (up to 20 lags) and ARCH effects (up to 5
lags) judging by Ljung–Box Q-statistic and LM conditional
variance test.
4. Econometric methodology
The two-stage cross-correlation function (CCF) ap-
proach proposed by Cheung and Ng (1996) and modiﬁed
by Hong (2001) is used. It has become widespread in ana-
lyzing causality between stock market returns (Korkmaz,
Cevik, & Atukeren, 2012; Xu & Hamori, 2012), sovereign
bond yields (Tamakoshi, 2011) and different segments of the
ﬁnancial sector (Tamakoshi & Hamori, 2014a).
At the ﬁrst stage GARCH models should be ﬁtted
to univariate series in question. Usually Autoregressive, Gen-
eralized Autoregressive Conditional Heterodoskedasticity
(AR–GARCH) or Autoregressive, Exponential Generalized
Autoregressive Conditional Heterodoskedasticity (AR–
EGARCH) speciﬁcations are considered. Autoregressive-
moving-average (ARMA)models for mean equations are also
possible.
At the second stage special statistics to study causality-
in-mean and causality-in-variance are computed on the basis
of standardized residuals and squared standardized residu-
als derived from the ﬁtted AR/ARMA–GARCH model. The
standardized residuals ν and squared standardized residu-
als u are represented respectively as follows:
ν
φ μ
=
−t
th
(1)
u
h
t
t
=
−( )φ μ 2 (2)
where φt are residuals of the AR/ARMA–GARCHmodel, μ –
mean of the residuals and ht – conditional variance. Let η
and ρ be standardized residuals and squared standardized
residuals for another AR/ARMA–GARCHmodel ﬁtted to the
series that presumably has causal linkages with the series
inquestion. Inorder to test thenull hypothesis of no causality-
in-mean between the two series during the ﬁrst k lags, an
S-statistic proposed by Cheung and Ng (1996) following a
null asymptotic χ2 k( ) distribution is computed: Tab
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S T r i
i
k
1
2
1
= ( )
=
∑ νη (3)
where T is the sample size of the residual series, k – the
number of lags and r iνη2 ( ) – squared cross-correlation ratio
between the standardized residuals ν and η at lag i . In case
of causality-in-variance this statistic is calculated in the same
way, the standardized residuals being replaced with squared
standardized residuals u and ρ :
S T r iu
i
k
2
2
1
= ( )
=
∑ ρ . (4)
The shortcoming of this S-statistic is that each lag is
weighted uniformly, making no difference between recent
and distant cross-correlations. It is inconsistent with an in-
tuitive expectation that more recent information should play
a primary role, with cross-correlations decreasing to 0 as
the lag order increases. Hong (2001) proposed a new
Q-statistic to overcome this weakness of the S-statistic. The
Q-statistics to test causality-in-mean and causality-in-
variance are given as follows:
Q
S k
k
NL1
1
2
0 1=
−
⎯ →⎯ ( ), (5)
Q
S k
k
NL2
2
2
0 1=
−
⎯ →⎯ ( ), . (6)
Q-statistic is designed to test one-sided causality; upper-
tailed standard normal distribution critical values must be
used. If the Q-statistic is larger than the critical value of the
normal distribution, the null hypothesis of no causality
during the ﬁrst k lags is rejected.
5. Results and discussion
According to the CCF approach, at the ﬁrst stage ade-
quate GARCHmodels have been ﬁtted to the ﬁrst-differenced
CDS price series and VIX index. For all the variables
ARMA(k,m)–GARCH(p,q) models have been selected. The
general speciﬁcation is represented as follows:
x a a x bt i t i
i
k
i t i
i
m
t t= + + + ∼−
=
−
=
∑ ∑0
1 1
ε ε ε, GED (7)
σ α β σt i t i
i
p
i t i
i
q
w u2 2
1
2
1
= + +
−
=
−
=
∑ ∑ (8)
Generalized error distribution (GED) is assumed in our
speciﬁcation. k 1 2 10, ,…( ) , m 1 2 10, ,…( ) as well as p 1 2,( )
and q 1 2,( ) are determined by means of Schwartz Bayes-
ian information criterion (SBIC) while conducting residual
diagnostics to avoid autocorrelation. The GARCH (1,1)
model has been selected for all variance equations6
whereas the order of ARMA models ﬁtted to mean equa-
tions differs. Table 2 presents the parameter estimates for
all the models.
All ARCH (α1) and GARCH ( β1) coeﬃcients are statisti-
cally signiﬁcant at least at the 5% level. The Ljung–Box
statistics, Q-stat(20) and Qsq-stat(20), show that the null
hypothesis of no autocorrelation up to lag 20 for the stan-
dardized and squared standardized residuals holds at the
6 ARMA(k, m)–EGARCH(1,1) speciﬁcations that account for a possible
asymmetry in volatility dynamics have also been considered but they do
not outperform standard GARCH (1,1) by their statistical quality, namely,
by the values of maximum likelihood estimators of the equations and
Schwartz Bayesian information criterion (SBIC).
Table 2
Empirical results of ARMA(k,m)–GARCH(1,1) models.
Gazprom Russia Sberbank VTB VIX
ARMA(2,4)–GARCH(1,1) ARMA(2,2)–GARCH(1,1) ARMA(3,3)–GARCH(1,1) ARMA(3,3)–GARCH(1,1) ARMA(1,1)–GARCH(1,1)
Estimate SE Estimate SE Estimate SE Estimate SE Estimate SE
Mean equation
a0 −0.33** 0.16 −0.16 0.13 −0.07 0.06 −0.26*** 0.09 −0.07*** 0.01
a1 −0.17 0.22 1.26*** 0.11 0.25** 0.11 0.29* 0.15 0.87*** 0.02
a2 0.59*** 0.2 −0.69*** 0.09 0.73*** 0.07 −0.59*** 0.09
a3 −0.47*** 0.04 0.15** 0.07
b1 0.31 0.22 −1.21*** 0.12 −0.17 0.11 −0.22 0.15 −0.96*** 0.01
b2 −0.51** 0.22 0.66*** 0.09 −0.70*** 0.08 0.61*** 0.09
b3 −0.07* 0.04 0.41 0.03 −0.08 0.07
b4 −0.07** 0.03
Variance equation
w 1.43*** 0.49 0.73** 0.29 2.68*** 0.88 2.35*** 0.9 0.20*** 0.05
α1 0.18*** 0.03 0.13*** 0.02 0.18*** 0.05 0.11*** 0.03 0.24*** 0.06
β1 0.82*** 0.03 0.86*** 0.02 0.81*** 0.04 0.87*** 0.02 0.69*** 0.05
GED parameter 1.10*** 0.06 1.13*** 0.06 0.68*** 0.03 0.67*** 0.03 0.98*** 0.05
Log likelihood −3671.61 −3447.95 −3455.1 −3715.75 −1791.54
Q-stat(20) 24.12 23.34 8.04 22.55 18.98
p-value 0.12 0.13 0.89 0.11 0.39
Qsq-stat(20) 18.91 10.29 23.15 15.95 23
p-value 0.18 0.85 0.13 0.31 0.19
*, ** and *** Statistically signiﬁcant at 10, 5 and 1% signiﬁcance level, respectively.
75M. Stolbov / Journal of Eurasian Studies 7 (2016) 71–84
1% signiﬁcance level. It enables to argue that the model
speciﬁcations are reasonably good and can be used at the
second stage of the CCF approach.
Appendix reports empirical results of the CCF analysis
to test for the null hypothesis of no causality up to lag k ,
measured in days, for each combination of the series. To gen-
eralize the results in a convenient way, causality linkage
matrices for causality-in-mean and causality-in-variance are
ﬁlled in (Tables 3 and 4).
The intensity of linkages between Russian sovereign
and quasi-sovereign CDS prices in regard to causality-in-
mean is not very high (only 5 out of 16 possible causal
linkages), which is an unexpected ﬁnding, taking high
pairwise correlations between the series into account. Thus,
these high correlations should be attributed to the VIX
index dynamics, a third factor driving means of Russian
sovereign and quasi-sovereign CDS prices. The VIX index
has the highest number of outgoing causal linkages as it
inﬂuences all the Russian CDS series and its impact with
respect to causality-in-mean is unidirectional. The result
is consistent with the ﬁndings by Longstaff, Pan, Pedersen,
and Singleton (2011) who conducted a comprehensive study
of sovereign risk determinants and concluded that CDS
spreads are more related to global factors such as the US
stock market and the volatility risk premium embedded
in the VIX index. The impact of global volatility on sover-
eign and corporate CDS spreads of developing and emerging
economies is also corroborated by several studies at na-
tional and regional levels (Eyssell, Fung, & Zhang, 2013;
Fender, Hayo, & Neuenkirch, 2012; Wang, Yang, & Yang,
2013). Among the Russian CDS series the sovereign CDS
prices Granger cause Sberbank and VTB CDS series without
any feedback effects. The result meshes well with the de-
scribed post-bailouts pattern of CDS price co-movement
for the Eurozone countries. However, there are no signs of
any causality-in-mean running from quasi-sovereign CDS
prices to the sovereign one. Surprisingly, no causality-in-
mean is observed between the sovereign and Gazprom
CDS. Of the two bank CDS, Sberbank is the most suscepti-
ble to incoming causality-in-mean as it is Granger caused
by the rest of the CDS without exerting any inﬂuence
itself.
As for causality-in-variance, the intensity of linkages
between Russian sovereign and quasi-sovereign CDS prices
appears more signiﬁcant (10 out of 16 potential connec-
tions). The VIX index exerts inﬂuence on all the CDS series
but also receives feedback from the sovereign, Sberbank and
VTB. The causality-in-variance running from the Russian CDS
to the VIX index is much weaker than in the opposite di-
rection but statistically signiﬁcant. Thus, Russian sovereign
and quasi-sovereign credit risk contributed to the global vol-
atility during May 2009–July 2013. In case of Sberbank and
VTB, the ﬁnding is consistent with their multinational status
and an extensive exposure to cross-border capital ﬂows.7
Besides, there is evidence for a feedback from the bank to
sovereign CDS prices. Gazprom CDS prices are driven by the
sovereign but Granger cause those of Sberbank and VTB.
Again, Sberbank has a negative balance of outgoing and in-
coming causal linkages.
The signiﬁcant causal feedback which the sovereign CDS
prices receive from the quasi-sovereign CDS is consistent
with the data on open positions in this market. The cumu-
lative net notional position8 of the quasi-sovereign CDS
(Gazprom, Sberbank, VTB) is comparable or at some in-
stants exceeds that of the sovereign CDS in May 2009–
July 2013 (Table 5).
By comparing the net notional to gross notional posi-
tions (Table 6) one can also conclude that Russia and
Gazprom CDS bear a signiﬁcantly lower risk than the bank
CDS and among the banks VTB CDS tends to be riskier than
Sberbank. These facts enable to hypothesize that the bank
CDS may have had an important potential for the price dis-
covery of the sovereign CDS as it was found in case of the
resilient EU economies by Avino and Cotter (2014). However,
this hypothesis is left for future research.
Overall, there is a tight causal connectedness between
the sovereign and quasi-sovereign CDS prices. The impact
of the quasi-sovereign CDS, in particular, those of banks, on
the sovereign is channeled via increased foreign exposure.
It is noteworthy that banks have an enormous share of the
7 According to the 2013 ranking of Top 1000 by The Banker magazine,
Sberbank is ranked 34th among the biggest world banks. It operates in
20 countries including the CIS, CEE and Turkey. VTB occupies 70th posi-
tion in. It has subsidiaries in more than 20 countries, including the CIS,
EU, Asia and Africa.
8 Net notional positions in the CDS market are proxies for the maximum
possible net funds transfers between sellers and buyers of CDS contracts
that could be required upon the occurrence of a credit event. Thus, this
indicator is instrumental in assessing “tangible” risk that CDS contracts
incur.
Table 3
Causality-in-mean between Gazprom, Russia, Sberbank, VTB CDS prices
and VIX index, daily data, May 2009–July 2013.
Gazprom Russia Sberbank VTB VIX Incoming
linkages
Gazprom + 1
Russia + 1
Sberbank + + + + 4
VTB + + + 3
VIX 0
Outgoing
linkages
2 2 0 1 4
Granger causing variables are in the upper horizontal line; Granger caused
variables are in the left column. Only causal linkages signiﬁcant at least
at the 5% level are taken into account and denoted as “+”.
Table 4
Causality-in-variance between Gazprom, Russia, Sberbank, VTB CDS prices
and VIX index, daily data, May 2009–July 2013.
Gazprom Russia Sberbank VTB VIX Incoming
linkages
Gazprom + + 2
Russia + + + 3
Sberbank + + + 3
VTB + + + 3
VIX + + + 3
Outgoing
linkages
2 3 2 3 4
Granger causing variables are in the upper horizontal line; Granger caused
variables are in the left column. Only causal linkages signiﬁcant at least
at the 5% level are taken into account and denoted as “+”.
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total international debt of the Russian Federation, with
government-controlled entities playing the primary role. This
indicator was 31.5% as of June 2009 and 29.9% in June 2013,
showing no deleveraging by the banking sector in light of
the total debt increase from 466 to 708 bln US dollars during
this period. This results in massive contingent liabilities for
the Russian government which will materialize in case of
external shocks to the banking sector. These shocks need
not be purely economic but may also be driven by politi-
cal issues such as the sanctions on the state-aﬃliated banks
imposed in 2014. Non-ﬁnancial state-aﬃliated companies
are in the same situation.
Meanwhile, the systemic role of Gazprom, VTB and
Sberbank in the domestic market strengthened over 2009–
2013 (Fig. 2) and the “too big to save” effect is likely to
emerge as a result. This effect is deﬁnitely not immediate
and can gradually emanate from the “too big-to fail” phe-
nomenon aggravated by deteriorating ﬁscal balance of a
country.9 The link between the two effects is discussed by
Barth and Schnabel (2013) and Demirguc-Kunt and Huizinga
(2013).
The burdensome contingent liabilities and the over-
whelming shares of the government-controlled companies
reduce the likelihood of eﬃcient bail-ins of these entities
in case of another ﬁnancial turmoil while the shift from bail-
outs to bail-ins is one of the main trends in ﬁnancial
supervision and regulation after the 2007–2009 global crisis.
In this context, it is no surprise that state-owned compa-
nies and banks requested the Russian government for
another wave of re-capitalization in late 2014. Of the three
9 By now the ﬁscal balance of Russia has generally remained sustain-
able. However, in the longer run there are at least two concerns identiﬁed
by domestic and international experts – the above mentioned contin-
gent liabilities and burdensome increases in health and pension spending.
See, for example, IMF (2014).
Table 5
Net notional open positions on Gazprom, Russia, Sberbank, VTB CDS, bln US dollars, May 2009–July 2013.
May
2009
December
2009
May
2010
December
2010
May
2011
December
2011
May
2012
December
2012
July
2013
Russia 6.7 4.7 3.8 3.9 4.5 4.1 4.3 4.5 5.4
Gazprom 3.1 3.4 3.1 2.8 2.1 2.4 2.5 2.5 1.9
VTB 2.2 1.6 2.0 1.9 2.2 1.8 1.9 1.5 1.2
Sberbank 1.1 1.6 1.0 0.8 0.6 0.7 0.8 1.1 1.0
Source: Deposit and Trust Clearing Corporation (DTCC) data.
Table 6
Net notional to gross notional open positions ratio for Gazprom, Russia, Sberbank, VTB CDS, %, May 2009–July 2013.
May
2009
December
2009
May
2010
December
2010
May
2011
December
2011
May
2012
December
2012
July
2013
Russia 6.5 4.4 3.2 4.1 4.4 3.6 3.8 4.1 4.2
Gazprom 6.0 5.0 4.4 4.1 3.2 3.4 4.2 4.7 3.8
VTB 9.9 7.0 7.5 7.6 8.1 7.0 7.2 6.6 6.4
Sberbank 8.5 9.8 6.6 5.1 3.5 4.2 4.4 6.5 6.7
Source: Author’s estimations based on Deposit and Trust Clearing Corporation (DTCC) data.
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Fig. 2. Total assets of Gazprom, VTB and Sberbank to GDP and consolidated federal budget receipts, %, 2009–2013. Source: Author’s estimations based on
Rosstat data and ﬁnancial statements of the companies.
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entities in question, VTB Group was the ﬁrst to solicit the
bailout up to 5 bln US dollars.
Another channel throughwhich the “deadlyembrace”may
workinRussia isthesovereign-corporatecreditratinglink.There
is empirical evidence that sovereign credit rating downgrades
have a strong adverse impact on the bank ratings in advanced
economies and emerging markets (Adelino & Ferreira, 2014;
Alsakka, ap Gwilym, &Nhung Vu, 2014; Huang & Shen, 2015;
Williams, Alsakka, & ap Gwilym, 2013). Interestingly, Aktug,
Nayar, and Vasconcellos (2013) also ﬁnd an inverse relation
between sovereign credit ratings and national bank concen-
tration ratios. Cantero-Saiz, Sanﬁlippo-Azofra, Torre-Olmo, and
López-Gutiérrez (2014) ﬁnd that increased sovereign risk sig-
niﬁcantly curbs loan supply under tight monetary policy
regimes. Since the sanctions were imposed, the downgrades
have occurred indeed, further barring the banks from access
to international capital markets.
Sizeable sovereign bond holdings by the banking sector
may exacerbate this effect as indicated by De Marco (2013),
Popov and van Horen (2013), Albertazzi, Ropele, and Sene
(2014), Gennaioli, Martin, and Rossi (2014). Higher sover-
eign risk leads to value losses on banks’ holdings of sovereign
debt, thus impairing their balance sheets and entailing a
limited access to wholesale funding. It may eventually offset
the cushioning effect of explicit and implicit government
guarantees (Schich & Lindh, 2012). While VTB Group held
a negligible share of its assets (0–0.3%) in the national sov-
ereign bonds in 2009–2013, sovereign debt holdings totaled
a signiﬁcant share of Sberbank assets (up to 8%). More-
over, Sberbank appears to be the key market maker,
accounting for up to 70% of total sovereign debt holdings
by the Russian banking sector (Fig. 3).
Therefore, the credit risk of the Russian banking sector
and non-ﬁnancial ﬁrms is likely to rise along with an in-
crease in the sovereign risk.10 This is a manifestation of the
causal connectedness between the sovereign and quasi-
sovereign CDS prices that has been uncovered in the paper.
It may involve negative repercussions for ﬁnancial and ﬁscal
stability given the geopolitical challenges that Russia is
facing.
6. Robustness checks
Two robustness checks are conducted to verify the va-
lidity of the ﬁndings presented above. First, the CCF approach
is implemented on weekly data. It is legitimized by the fact
that when tested on daily data, there are contemporane-
ous information ﬂows between the variables that may create
“noise” and even mask robust causal linkages. The econo-
metric methodology to conduct Granger causality tests on
weekly data is the same as described in Section 4. The results
are presented in Tables 7 and 8.11
The number of causal linkages revealed on weekly data
is signiﬁcantly lower than on daily data regarding both
causality-in-mean and causality-in-variance. Global vola-
tility embedded in the VIX index has retained its pivotal role
10 Though there has been evidence that corporate CDS pricesmay be lower
than those of the corresponding sovereign (Lee, Naranjo, & Sirmans, 2013),
the Russian quasi-sovereign CDS prices were strictly above the sovereign
benchmark over 2009–2013.
11 A detailed econometric output underlying the causality tests is not in-
cluded for brevity but available from the author upon request.
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Fig. 3. Sovereign debt holdings by Sberbank, %, 2009–2013. Source: Author’s estimations based on the Bank of Russia data.
Table 7
Causality-in-mean between Gazprom, Russia, Sberbank, VTB CDS prices
and VIX index, weekly data, May 2009–July 2013.
Gazprom Russia Sberbank VTB VIX Incoming
linkages
Gazprom + 1
Russia + + 2
Sberbank + + 1
VTB + 1
VIX 0
Outgoing
linkages
0 1 0 1 4
Granger causing variables are in the upper horizontal line; Granger caused
variables are in the left column. Only causal linkages signiﬁcant at least
at the 5% level are taken into account and denoted as “+”.
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for the sovereign and quasi-sovereign Russian CDS series.
Besides, on weekly data the impact of bank CDS (Sberbank
and VTB) on the sovereign becomes more tangible, in par-
ticular, with respect to causality-in-variance.
The second robustness check is based on the Breitung
and Candelon (2006) test for causality in the frequency
domain. This test is motivated by the fact that causality may
vary not only along the time scale but also over different
frequencies. For example, causal linkages that are present
over 2 or 3-day long intervals may then disappear at lower
frequencies, e.g. over 7-day long intervals. To gauge the fre-
quency dimension of causality, Breitung and Candelon (2006)
proposed a speciﬁc test of (no) causality at a given frequen-
cy ω π∈( ]0; . The frequency ω can be converted into the time
scale as follows P =
2π
ω
, where P – period on the time scale
(in days, weeks, etc.).
The causality test in the frequency domain involves
estimating bivariate VAR models and Fourier transform of
the data. Though this test does not distinguish between
causality-in-mean and causality-in-variance, it has two at-
tractive properties which make it a plausible extension to
the CCF approach which is at the heart of this paper. First,
it allows the identiﬁcation of causality even if the true
interdependence between the two variables is non-linear;
second, the Breiting–Candelon test is valid in terms of
volatility clusters. In addition to these general advantages
of testing for causal linkages in the frequency domain, the
implementation of this test is legitimized by the fact that
the null hypothesis in the Hong test cannot be tested
at all possible lags. Thus, the null hypothesis of no
causality is accepted if it holds at all the lags under exam-
ination (p-value > 0.05 at all the lags from 1 to N, where N
normally is between 1 and 15). This cannot exclude the
situation that the null may be violated at a more distant
lag length.
Below the results of the Breitung–Candelon test con-
ducted on daily and weekly data are presented (Tables 9 and
10).12
As for daily data, the Breitung–Candelon test shows a high
degree of mutual dependence of all the CDS series and the
VIX index. The sovereign and bank CDS are characterized
by bi-directional causality almost across all the frequency
bands. The VIX index dynamics also appears to be sensi-
tive to the major Russian CDS prices and only in the case
12 For theoretical basis and technical details of the test see the original
Breitung and Candelon paper (2006). The corresponding GRETL routines
are available upon request from the author but only ﬁnal results are pre-
sented here for brevity.
Table 8
Causality-in-variance between Gazprom, Russia, Sberbank, VTB CDS prices and VIX index, weekly data, May 2009–July 2013.
Gazprom Russia Sberbank VTB VIX Incoming linkages
Gazprom + + + 3
Russia + + + 3
Sberbank + 1
VTB + 1
VIX 0
Outgoing linkages 0 0 2 2 4
Granger causing variables are in the upper horizontal line; Granger caused variables are in the left column. Only causal linkages signiﬁcant at least at the
5% level are taken into account and denoted as “+”.
Table 9
Causality in the frequency domain between Gazprom, Russia, Sberbank, VTB CDS prices and VIX index, daily data, May 2009–July 2013.
Gazprom Russia Sberbank VTB VIX
Gazprom l.o. = 8, [2; 3.1]U[3.5;
5.6]U[6.3;∞)
l.o. = 6, [2; 3.7]U[11.4; ∞) l.o. = 8, [2; 3.2]U[5.2; 7.9] l.o. = 8, [2; ∞)
Russia l.o. = 8, [2; 2.9]U[7.3; ∞) l.o. = 6, [12.1; ∞) l.o. = 8, [2; 2.2]U[3; 3.7]U[5.2;∞) l.o. = 4, [2; ∞)
Sberbank l.o. = 6, [2; ∞) l.o. = 6, [2; ∞) l.o. = 4, [2; 4.4]U[7.9; ∞) l.o. = 4, [2; ∞)
VTB l.o. = 8, [2; 2.3]U[2.5; ∞) l.o. = 8, [2; ∞) l.o. = 4, [2; 2.4]U[4.6; ∞) l.o. = 4, [2; ∞)
VIX l.o. = 8, [2; 2.3]U[2.5; 3.4]U[4;8.5] l.o. = 4, [3.3; ∞) l.o. = 4, [3.2; ∞) l.o. = 4, [2.9; 3.7]U[6.3; ∞)
l.o. – lag order in a corresponding bivariate VAR model selected on the basis of the Akaike information criterion (AIC).
Table 10
Causality in the frequency domain between Gazprom, Russia, Sberbank, VTB CDS prices and VIX index, weekly data, May 2009–July 2013.
Gazprom Russia Sberbank VTB VIX
Gazprom l.o. = 3, [14; ∞)
Russia l.o. = 6, [2.8; 3.5]U[6.8;∞)
Sberbank l.o. = 4, [3; 3.8]U[4.3; ∞) l.o. = 4, [2; ∞) l.o. = 9, [14; ∞) l.o. = 8, [2; 2.2]U[12.1; ∞)
VTB l.o. = 3, [2; ∞) l.o. = 6, [2; 2.2]U[2.7; 3.2]U[4.6;∞) l.o. = 9, [12.1; ∞) l.o. = 8, [16.1; ∞)
VIX l.o. = 3, [2; 2.8] l.o. = 8, [3.3; 8.9]U[10.8; ∞)
l.o. – lag order in a corresponding bivariate VAR model selected on the basis of the Akaike information criterion (AIC).
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of Gazprom CDS this impact is conﬁned to very high fre-
quencies (over 2–8.5 day horizons). The sovereign and bank
CDS prices exert inﬂuence over the VIX index at high and
lower frequencies.
There are fewer causal linkages using weekly data.
However, at these lower frequencies causality between the
sovereign and bank CDS prices also holds. The sovereign CDS
prices Granger cause Sberbank and VTB CDS series, receiv-
ing a strong feedback from VTB. The linkages between the
VIX index, the sovereign and Gazprom CDS have disap-
peared but they are mediated by the bank CDS prices,
especially by those of VTB which Granger causes and is
Granger caused by the rest of the series. Thus, at lower fre-
quencies the sovereign Russian CDS becomes indirectly
vulnerable to global volatility dynamics embedded in the
VIX index as the volatility is transmitted via the credit risk
of the major state-aﬃliated banks.
In a nutshell, the robustness checks generally corrobo-
rate the ﬁndings based on the CCF approach. The sovereign
and quasi-sovereign CDS series are highly sensitive to the
global volatility factor, though, to a certain extent, they
produce a feedback. There is also a signiﬁcant causal co-
movement between the sovereign and bank CDS prices, with
VTB (not Sberbank) playing the most important role among
the quasi-sovereign CDS.
7. Conclusions
Using the robust CCF approach the article has studied
causal linkages between sovereign, most important
quasi-sovereign CDS prices for Russia and the global vola-
tility factor embedded in the VIX index dynamics.
The analysis refers to the post-bailouts period in Russia
and distinguishes between causality-in-mean and
causality-in-variance.
Two major ﬁndings are documented. First, global vola-
tility contributes signiﬁcantly to the Russian CDS prices,
both sovereign and quasi-sovereign. This impact is partic-
ularly pronounced with respect to causality-in-mean. The
causality-in-variance tests point to a moderate yet statis-
tically signiﬁcant feedback in the opposite direction – from
the sovereign and bank CDS prices to the VIX index. Second,
similar to the Eurozone experience, the article provides
evidence for causality-in-mean running from the sover-
eign CDS prices to the bank ones after the Russian
government interventions to bail out the ﬁnancial sector
in late 2008 while bi-directional linkages are found with
regard to causality-in-variance. The overall intensity of
linkages between the series is signiﬁcant for causality-in-
variance which aggravates the risk of volatility spillovers
and their ampliﬁcation.
The robustness checks based on weekly data and the
Breitung–Candelon test for causality in the frequency domain
conﬁrm these ﬁndings. High foreign exposure of the quasi-
sovereigns, public guarantees and the holdings of the Russian
sovereign debt on their balances underlie the causalities.
Given the systemic role that the government-controlled en-
tities play in the Russian economy this may lead to the “too
big to save” effect. Overall, the quantitative analysis helps
understand the effects that undermine ﬁnancial and ﬁscal
sustainability of the Russian economy while the latter is
facing a tough period of sanctions.
The policy implications of the paper are two-fold. First,
the results matter for policymakers who are keen tomonitor
credit risk associated with the most important Russian CDS
and better understand potential channels of contagion in
this volatile and insuﬃciently regulated market. In this
regard, the ﬁndings of the paper emphasize the perils of the
potential “too big to save” effect for the Russian economy
and hint at the advantage of downsizing the major
government-controlled entities via gradual privatization to
counter this effect. Second, the research is marked by special
value added in light of the recent Russian government ini-
tiative to develop a domestic CDSmarket. At a more applied
level, the participants of the CDS market may also ﬁnd the
results useful to improve their trading strategies.
Appendix
Table A1
Russia CDS–VIX causal linkages.
Causality-in-mean tests Causality-in-variance tests
Russia doesn’t
cause VIX
p-value VIX doesn’t
cause Russia
p-value Russia doesn’t
cause VIX
p-value VIX doesn’t
cause Russia
p-value
−0.421 0.663 2.863 0.002 −0.699 0.758 2.735 0.003
0.641 0.261 3.235 0.001 −0.666 0.747 3.237 0.001
0.254 0.400 4.415 0.000 −0.946 0.828 2.638 0.004
0.546 0.292 3.790 0.000 −0.830 0.797 2.112 0.017
0.298 0.383 3.113 0.001 −0.946 0.828 1.573 0.058
0.427 0.335 2.664 0.004 −1.098 0.864 1.149 0.125
0.359 0.360 2.241 0.012 −1.032 0.849 0.812 0.208
1.625 0.052 1.929 0.027 3.770 0.000 0.625 0.266
1.339 0.090 3.144 0.001 3.354 0.000 3.027 0.001
1.577 0.057 2.909 0.002 3.196 0.001 2.722 0.003
1.550 0.061 2.583 0.005 2.836 0.002 2.456 0.007
1.281 0.100 2.323 0.010 2.516 0.006 2.227 0.013
1.050 0.147 2.097 0.018 2.224 0.013 2.058 0.020
0.908 0.182 1.878 0.030 1.955 0.025 1.851 0.032
0.696 0.243 1.676 0.047 1.708 0.044 1.623 0.052
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Table A2
Gazprom CDS–VIX causal linkages.
Causality-in-mean tests Causality-in-variance tests
Gazprom doesn’t
cause VIX
p-value VIX doesn’t
cause Gazprom
p-value Gazprom doesn’t
cause VIX
p-value VIX doesn’t
cause Gazprom
p-value
−0.249 0.598 7.127 0.000 −0.406 0.658 13.935 0.000
−0.554 0.710 4.849 0.000 −0.678 0.751 9.721 0.000
−0.829 0.797 5.706 0.000 −0.813 0.792 7.754 0.000
−1.024 0.847 4.856 0.000 −1.016 0.845 6.592 0.000
−1.198 0.884 4.117 0.000 −1.166 0.878 5.633 0.000
−1.233 0.891 3.843 0.000 −1.290 0.901 4.977 0.000
−0.721 0.765 3.518 0.000 −0.378 0.647 4.397 0.000
1.307 0.096 3.057 0.001 1.255 0.105 3.866 0.000
1.257 0.104 3.043 0.001 0.960 0.168 3.773 0.000
1.415 0.079 2.672 0.004 1.037 0.150 3.417 0.000
1.137 0.128 2.352 0.009 0.810 0.209 3.057 0.001
0.954 0.170 2.087 0.018 0.583 0.280 2.764 0.003
0.969 0.166 1.929 0.027 0.371 0.355 2.770 0.003
0.864 0.194 1.672 0.047 0.189 0.425 2.484 0.006
0.679 0.249 1.449 0.074 0.021 0.491 2.258 0.012
Table A3
Sberbank CDS–VIX causal linkages.
Causality-in-mean tests Causality-in-variance tests
Sberbank doesn’t
cause VIX
p-value VIX doesn’t
cause Sberbank
p-value Sberbank doesn’t
cause VIX
p-value VIX doesn’t
cause Sberbank
p-value
−0.649 0.742 20.719 0.000 −0.209 0.583 15.894 0.000
−0.788 0.785 14.683 0.000 −0.643 0.740 10.776 0.000
−0.660 0.745 11.708 0.000 −0.612 0.730 8.428 0.000
−0.910 0.818 9.798 0.000 −0.853 0.803 6.971 0.000
−0.665 0.747 8.459 0.000 −1.036 0.850 5.931 0.000
−0.587 0.721 7.558 0.000 −1.069 0.857 5.174 0.000
0.790 0.215 6.814 0.000 3.911 0.000 4.544 0.000
0.548 0.292 6.124 0.000 3.473 0.000 4.031 0.000
0.655 0.256 5.552 0.000 3.348 0.000 3.575 0.000
0.424 0.336 7.212 0.000 2.991 0.001 3.902 0.000
0.315 0.376 6.669 0.000 2.759 0.003 3.515 0.000
0.306 0.380 6.206 0.000 2.458 0.007 3.192 0.001
0.158 0.437 5.811 0.000 2.165 0.015 2.883 0.002
0.114 0.455 5.647 0.000 1.900 0.029 2.591 0.005
0.416 0.339 5.273 0.000 1.839 0.033 2.365 0.009
Table A4
VTB CDS–VIX causal linkages.
Causality-in-mean tests Causality-in-variance tests
VTB doesn’t
cause VIX
p-value VIX doesn’t
cause VTB
p-value VTB doesn’t
cause VIX
p-value VIX doesn’t
cause VTB
p-value
−0.464 0.679 6.008 0.000 −0.609 0.729 2.809 0.002
−0.580 0.719 4.812 0.000 −0.924 0.822 1.842 0.033
−0.808 0.790 3.754 0.000 −0.807 0.790 1.396 0.081
−0.797 0.787 3.482 0.000 −1.010 0.844 0.897 0.185
−0.605 0.727 2.845 0.002 −0.852 0.803 0.708 0.240
−0.242 0.595 2.949 0.002 −0.780 0.782 0.556 0.289
1.179 0.119 2.714 0.003 1.902 0.029 0.249 0.402
0.901 0.184 2.368 0.009 1.533 0.063 0.160 0.436
0.908 0.182 2.030 0.021 1.242 0.107 −0.078 0.531
1.318 0.094 2.496 0.006 1.071 0.142 0.159 0.437
1.072 0.142 2.221 0.013 0.813 0.208 −0.054 0.521
0.996 0.160 1.925 0.027 0.699 0.242 −0.123 0.549
0.763 0.223 1.971 0.024 0.520 0.302 −0.213 0.584
1.056 0.145 1.731 0.042 0.400 0.345 −0.364 0.642
1.062 0.144 1.603 0.054 0.236 0.407 −0.512 0.696
81M. Stolbov / Journal of Eurasian Studies 7 (2016) 71–84
Table A5
Russia–Gazprom CDS causal linkages.
Lag length Causality-in-mean tests Causality-in-variance tests
Gazprom doesn’t
cause Russia
p-value Russia doesn’t
cause Gazprom
p-value Gazprom doesn’t
cause Russia
p-value Russia doesn’t
cause Gazprom
p-value
1 −0.253 0.600 0.360 0.359 0.820 0.206 9.865 0.000
2 −0.659 0.745 0.629 0.265 0.429 0.334 7.090 0.000
3 −0.576 0.718 0.311 0.378 0.802 0.211 5.578 0.000
4 −0.716 0.763 −0.077 0.531 0.519 0.302 4.478 0.000
5 1.086 0.139 −0.001 0.500 0.196 0.422 3.725 0.000
6 0.729 0.233 −0.060 0.524 −0.106 0.542 3.165 0.001
7 0.428 0.334 −0.275 0.608 −0.006 0.502 2.669 0.004
8 0.151 0.440 0.078 0.469 −0.255 0.601 2.478 0.007
9 0.426 0.335 0.069 0.473 0.088 0.465 2.273 0.012
10 0.211 0.416 −0.139 0.555 0.034 0.486 2.022 0.022
11 0.049 0.480 −0.345 0.635 −0.133 0.553 1.714 0.043
12 −0.142 0.556 −0.494 0.689 −0.310 0.622 1.437 0.075
13 −0.332 0.630 −0.644 0.740 −0.383 0.649 1.292 0.098
14 −0.506 0.694 −0.754 0.775 −0.479 0.684 1.089 0.138
15 −0.639 0.739 −0.593 0.723 −0.577 0.718 1.117 0.132
Table A6
Russia–Sberbank CDS causal linkages.
Lag length Causality-in-mean tests Causality-in-variance tests
Sberbank doesn’t
cause Russia
p-value Russia doesn’t
cause Sberbank
p-value Sberbank doesn’t
cause Russia
p-value Russia doesn’t
cause Sberbank
p-value
1 −0.661 0.746 37.158 0.000 28.486 0.000 −0.028 0.511
2 −0.831 0.797 26.271 0.000 19.649 0.000 −0.417 0.662
3 −0.230 0.591 21.153 0.000 15.635 0.000 −0.643 0.740
4 0.478 0.316 17.968 0.000 13.340 0.000 −0.854 0.803
5 0.250 0.401 15.927 0.000 11.728 0.000 −1.080 0.860
6 −0.006 0.502 14.334 0.000 10.417 0.000 −1.252 0.895
7 −0.263 0.604 13.196 0.000 9.381 0.000 −1.113 0.867
8 −0.212 0.584 12.899 0.000 8.532 0.000 −1.279 0.900
9 −0.295 0.616 11.991 0.000 8.231 0.000 −1.017 0.845
10 0.020 0.492 11.588 0.000 7.790 0.000 −0.987 0.838
11 −0.082 0.533 11.440 0.000 7.540 0.000 −1.059 0.855
12 −0.197 0.578 11.019 0.000 7.089 0.000 −1.195 0.884
13 −0.331 0.630 10.417 0.000 6.624 0.000 −1.234 0.891
14 0.302 0.381 9.867 0.000 6.441 0.000 −1.368 0.914
15 0.117 0.454 9.578 0.000 6.130 0.000 −1.456 0.927
Table A7
Russia–VTB CDS causal linkages.
Lag length Causality-in-mean tests Causality-in-variance tests
VTB doesn’t
cause Russia
p-value Russia doesn’t
cause VTB
p-value VTB doesn’t
cause Russia
p-value Russia doesn’t
cause VTB
p-value
1 0.407 0.342 34.571 0.000 1.832 0.034 51.498 0.000
2 −0.174 0.569 24.760 0.000 0.795 0.213 36.757 0.000
3 0.168 0.433 20.095 0.000 0.732 0.232 29.665 0.000
4 −0.049 0.519 17.317 0.000 0.326 0.372 25.411 0.000
5 −0.051 0.520 15.743 0.000 −0.002 0.501 22.921 0.000
6 1.278 0.101 15.174 0.000 0.467 0.320 21.600 0.000
7 1.562 0.059 13.811 0.000 2.579 0.005 19.733 0.000
8 1.263 0.103 12.673 0.000 2.169 0.015 18.262 0.000
9 1.006 0.157 11.759 0.000 1.913 0.028 16.997 0.000
10 0.767 0.222 10.944 0.000 1.666 0.048 15.901 0.000
11 0.540 0.295 10.318 0.000 1.438 0.075 15.039 0.000
12 0.314 0.377 9.675 0.000 1.198 0.115 14.296 0.000
13 0.397 0.346 9.104 0.000 1.052 0.146 13.542 0.000
14 0.790 0.215 8.642 0.000 1.340 0.090 12.930 0.000
15 0.582 0.280 8.363 0.000 1.211 0.113 12.401 0.000
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Table A8
Gazprom–Sberbank CDS causal linkages.
Lag length Causality-in-mean tests Causality-in-variance tests
Sberbank doesn’t
cause Gazprom
p-value Gazprom doesn’t
cause Sberbank
p-value Sberbank doesn’t
cause Gazprom
p-value Gazprom doesn’t
cause Sberbank
p-value
1 −0.702 0.759 23.760 0.000 −0.694 0.756 29.661 0.000
2 −0.848 0.802 16.843 0.000 −0.892 0.814 20.933 0.000
3 −0.169 0.567 13.348 0.000 −1.111 0.867 16.719 0.000
4 −0.205 0.581 11.206 0.000 −1.177 0.880 14.228 0.000
5 −0.226 0.590 10.474 0.000 −1.365 0.914 12.425 0.000
6 −0.105 0.542 10.455 0.000 −1.341 0.910 14.144 0.000
7 −0.358 0.640 10.020 0.000 −1.508 0.934 12.966 0.000
8 −0.504 0.693 10.133 0.000 −1.258 0.896 12.270 0.000
9 −0.637 0.738 9.324 0.000 −1.172 0.879 11.336 0.000
10 −0.502 0.692 9.282 0.000 −1.079 0.860 11.487 0.000
11 −0.684 0.753 8.727 0.000 −1.232 0.891 10.819 0.000
12 −0.704 0.759 8.389 0.000 −1.383 0.917 10.331 0.000
13 −0.852 0.803 8.454 0.000 −1.512 0.935 10.112 0.000
14 −0.064 0.526 7.991 0.000 −1.466 0.929 9.576 0.000
15 −0.130 0.552 7.600 0.000 −1.479 0.930 9.258 0.000
Table A9
Gazprom–VTB CDS causal linkages.
Lag length Causality-in-mean tests Causality-in-variance tests
VTB doesn’t
cause Gazprom
p-value Gazprom doesn’t
cause VTB
p-value VTB doesn’t
cause Gazprom
p-value Gazprom doesn’t
cause VTB
p-value
1 −0.467 0.680 38.607 0.000 0.234 0.408 58.126 0.000
2 −0.828 0.796 27.239 0.000 −0.299 0.618 40.851 0.000
3 −0.888 0.813 21.876 0.000 −0.621 0.733 32.946 0.000
4 −1.066 0.857 18.785 0.000 −0.823 0.795 28.235 0.000
5 −1.257 0.896 16.525 0.000 −0.700 0.758 25.014 0.000
6 −0.690 0.755 16.181 0.000 −0.132 0.553 23.416 0.000
7 −0.356 0.639 14.744 0.000 0.876 0.191 21.463 0.000
8 −0.581 0.720 13.564 0.000 0.636 0.263 19.848 0.000
9 −0.687 0.754 12.582 0.000 0.628 0.265 18.551 0.000
10 −0.871 0.808 12.103 0.000 0.495 0.310 17.511 0.000
11 −0.850 0.802 11.458 0.000 0.283 0.389 16.613 0.000
12 −0.987 0.838 10.766 0.000 0.100 0.460 15.912 0.000
13 −0.527 0.701 10.187 0.000 0.151 0.440 15.108 0.000
14 −0.119 0.547 9.718 0.000 0.101 0.460 14.471 0.000
15 −0.287 0.613 9.216 0.000 0.049 0.480 13.839 0.000
Table A10
Sberbank–VTB CDS causal linkages.
Lag length Causality-in-mean tests Causality-in-variance tests
VTB doesn’t
cause Sberbank
p-value Sberbank doesn’t
cause VTB
p-value VTB doesn’t
cause Sberbank
p-value Sberbank doesn’t
cause VTB
p-value
1 6.466 0.000 0.702 0.241 1.705 0.044 −0.566 0.714
2 4.425 0.000 0.110 0.456 1.071 0.142 −0.852 0.803
3 3.462 0.000 −0.269 0.606 0.469 0.319 −1.104 0.865
4 2.652 0.004 −0.519 0.698 0.263 0.396 −1.175 0.880
5 3.434 0.000 −0.678 0.751 0.390 0.348 −1.320 0.907
6 3.079 0.001 −0.619 0.732 0.125 0.450 −1.400 0.919
7 2.660 0.004 −0.684 0.753 −0.066 0.526 0.072 0.471
8 2.558 0.005 −0.796 0.787 −0.127 0.550 −0.166 0.566
9 2.284 0.011 −0.900 0.816 −0.240 0.595 −0.307 0.621
10 1.993 0.023 −1.001 0.842 −0.376 0.646 −0.400 0.655
11 1.713 0.043 −0.923 0.822 −0.452 0.674 −0.541 0.706
12 1.521 0.064 −0.732 0.768 −0.591 0.723 −0.570 0.716
13 1.478 0.070 −0.880 0.811 −0.764 0.778 −0.737 0.769
14 2.364 0.009 −0.749 0.773 −0.123 0.549 −0.876 0.810
15 2.137 0.016 −0.892 0.814 −0.239 0.594 −0.939 0.826
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